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Who has benefited financially from investment treaty arbitration?
An evaluation of the size and wealth of claimants
Gus Van Harten and Pavel Malysheuski
Osgoode Hall Law School
I.

Introduction

The sociological legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration, commonly known as
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), appears to depend in part on an expectation
that it benefits smaller businesses, not just large multinationals and the super wealthy.1
Proposed trade agreements that would expand greatly the role of ISDS – such as the
U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Europe-U.S. Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP), and Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA) – have been promoted as delivering benefits for smaller enterprises.2
We examined the relationship between ISDS and smaller firms by collecting data on size
and wealth of the foreign investors that have brought claims and received monetary
awards due to ISDS. Our main findings are that the beneficiaries of ISDS-ordered
financial transfers,3 in the aggregate, have overwhelmingly been companies with more
than USD1 billion in annual revenue – especially extra-large companies with more than
USD10 billion – and individuals who have over USD100 million in net wealth. ISDS has
produced monetary benefits primarily for those companies or individuals at the expense
of respondent states.
Thus, we found that companies with over USD1 billion in annual revenue and individuals
with over USD100 million in net wealth received about 94.5% of the aggregate
compensation (93.5% if pre-award interest is included) ordered by first-instance ISDS
tribunals. The remaining roughly 5.5% (or 6.5%) of the ordered compensation went to
companies with less than USD1 billion in annual revenues, unknown companies, and
1

Our use of the term sociological legitimacy draws on D. Behn, O.K. Fauchald, and M. Langford, “How to approach
‘legitimacy’ for the book project Empirical Perspectives on the Legitimacy of International Investment Tribunals”,
prepared for the August 2015 workshop of the University of Oslo’s Pluricourts Project. The comments from
participants in the workshop are gratefully acknowledged.
2
S. Lynch, “EU-US trade deal will benefit SMEs, says Brussels” The Irish Times (21 April 2015); P. Parks, “Critics of
Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal warn about arbitration clause”. See also Movement for Responsibility in Trade
Agreements, “Five questions SME businesses need to ask themselves about TTIP”
https://moreforsmesthanttip.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/fivequestionssmesneedtoaskthemselvesaboutttipfinal-23-22.pdf
3
We do not use the term “financial transfers” to describe ISDS orders of compensation to foreign investors in a
negative way, as one participant in the Pluricourts Project workshop commented. Rather, we use the term in an
effort to avoid conveying a negative or positive assessment of the legitimacy of such orders of compensation.
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individuals whose net wealth appeared to be less than USD100 million. It was evident
that ISDS has also delivered substantial monetary benefits for the ISDS legal industry.
Incidentally, we also found that extra-large companies’ success rates in ISDS (70.8%),
measured by simple win-loss outcomes at the jurisdictional and merits stages of an ISDS
claim combined, exceeded by a large margin the success rates of other claimants
(42.2%). Yet the success rates of large (as opposed to extra-large) companies (44.7%)
and of super wealthy individuals (36.4%) at both of these stages combined was
comparable to those of other claimants (not including large or extra-large companies or
super wealthy individuals) (42.5%). The success rate of extra-large companies at the
merits stage in particular (82.9%) stood out compared to that of all other claimants
(57.9%).
Our analysis is descriptive in that it does not seek to predict future outcomes and does
not use more complex statistical tools. One should approach all of the numbers
presented here as approximate and keep in mind that variations in the experiences of
different actors may be coincidental. We suggest that the most useful findings are those
indicating a wide variation in these experiences and those appearing to contradict less
evidence-based claims in the field.
II.

Findings

A. Ordered financial transfers by size or wealth of beneficiary
It emerged from the analysis that ISDS – approached as a process that generates
ordered financial transfers – has primarily benefited extra-large or large companies and
super wealthy individuals. The great majority of ordered transfers, in the aggregate,
have gone to such actors. Findings and data are outlined in the tables below. A more
detailed breakdown of the dataset is appended to this paper.
1. Aggregate ordered compensation
Size or wealth
of beneficiary

Measure of size or
wealth

Extra-large
company

>$10 billion in
annual revenue

Large company

>$1 billion and <$10
billion in annual
revenue
>$100 million and
<$1 billion in annual
revenue
<$100 million in

Medium
company
Small company

No. of cases
where
damages
ordered
26

Total awarded,
raw sum

5282 million

73.5%

6718 million

% awarded,
raw sum +
pre-award
interest
73.3%

14

601 million

8.4%

780 million

8.5%

4

13 million

0.2%

17 million

0.2%

4

80 million

1.1%

99 million

1.1%

2

% awarded,
raw sum

Total awarded,
raw sum + preaward interest

annual revenue
Unknown
company
Super wealthy
individual
Other
individual

Data unavailable
(DU) for annual
revenue
>$100 million in net
wealth
<$100 million in net
wealth

13

132 million

1.8%

154 million

1.7%

5

905 million

12.6%

1072 million

11.7%

20

179 million

2.5%

325 million

3.5%

2. Breakdown of cases
Case

Occidental v Ecuador No 2
Mobil v Venezuela

EDF v Argentina
BG Group v Argentina
CMS v Argentina
CGE/ Vivendi v Argentina No 2
Siemens v Argentina
Enron v Argentina
Azurix v Argentina
Sempra v Argentina
Suez & Interaguas
CME v Czech Republic
Stati v Kazakhstan
Rumeli v Kazakhstan

Micula v Romania

LG&E v Argentina
Chevron v Ecuador No 1
Siag v Egypt

ADC v Hungary

Cargill v Mexico
Deutsche Bank v Sri Lanka
Impregilo v Argentina
El Paso v Argentina
National Grid v Argentina
SAUR International v Argentina
Guaracachi v Bolivia
Pey Casado v Chile

Claimant
nationality
(with apparent
forum shopping
(FS) indicated)

Corporation
or natural
person

Claimant size or
wealth

Amount
awarded

Amount
awarded + preaward interest

USA
Netherlands
(FS: USA)

C
C

Extra-large
Extra-large

1770 million
1600 million

2358 million
2067 million

Belgium, France
UK
USA
France
Germany
USA
USA
USA
France
Netherlands
(FS: USA)
Moldova

C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
N

136 million
185 million
133 million
105 million
238 million
106 million
165 million
128 million
405 million
270 million

205 million
219 million
151 million
169 million
278 million
142 million
186 million
171 million
405 million
395 million

498 million

498 million

Turkey (FS: UK
for one of two
claimants, split
between two
nationalities i.e.
Turkey, UK)
Sweden

C

Extra-large
Extra-large
Large
Extra-large
Extra-large
Extra-large
Extra-large
Large
Extra-large
Super wealthy
individual
Super wealthy
individual
Large (with
Extra-large,
count as Extralarge)

125 million

165 million

N

Super wealthy
individual

117 million

156 million

USA
USA
Italy (FS: dual
national of
Egypt)
Cyprus (FS: data
unavailable
(DU))
USA
Germany

C
C
N

Extra-large
Extra-large
Other individual

57 million
78 million
75 million

57 million
96 million
129 million

C

Unknown

76 million

76 million

C
C

Extra-large
Extra-large

77 million
60 million

86 million
70 million

Italy
USA
UK
France
UK, USA
Spain

C
C
C
C
C
N

Large
Extra-large
Extra-large
Large
Small
Other individual
(and non-profit

21 million
43 million
39 million
40 million
29 million
10 million

28 million
66 million
54 million
60 million
36 million
14 million

N
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Netherlands
(FS: UK and
Germany)
USA

C

org)
Extra-large

35 million

35 million

C

Extra-large

72 million

75 million

Finland
Greece
Israel
USA

C
N
N
N

11 million
15 million
15 million
11 million

14 million
45 million
45 million
11 million

TECO v Guatemala
Abengoa v Mexico
ADM v Mexico
Metalclad v Mexico
SGS v Paraguay
Achmea v Slovakia No 1

USA
Spain
USA
USA (FS: DU)
Switzerland
Netherlands

C
C
C
C
C
C

Extra-large
Other individual
Other individual
Super wealthy
individual
Large
Extra-large
Large
Unknown
Large
Extra-large

Walter Bau v Thailand
Tidewater v Venezuela

Germany
Barbados (FS:
USA)
Oman
Netherlands

C
C

Small
Large

21 million
40 million
34 million
17 million
39 million
29 million (net
any taxes)
41 million
46 million

23 million
42 million
37 million
17 million
64 million
29 million (net
any taxes)
50 million
60 million

N
N

Other individual
Other individual

25 million
11 million

30 million
25 million

USA

C

Extra-large

2.8 million

3.6 million

Italy
Belgium
Belgium
USA
Malaysia
USA (FS: DU)

C
N
N
C
C
C

Extra-large
Other individual
Other individual
Medium
Medium
Unknown

6.3 million
3 million
1.2 million
6 million
5.9 million
9 million

11 million
3 million
2.2 million
8.3 million
7.4 million
9 million

Germany
USA
Greece (FS: DU)
UK (FS: DU)
Australia (FS:
DU)
USA
Gibraltar (FS:
DU)
Turkey (FS: DU)

N
C
C
C
C

Other individual
Extra-large
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown

3.1 million
5.6 million
2.2 million
8.8 million
4.1 million

4.1 million
28 million
3.8 million
19 million
11 million

C
C

Extra-large
Unknown

6 million
1.1 million

9.3 million
1.5 million

C

Unknown

8.5 million

10 million

Sweden
Sweden (FS:
DU)
USA
France
Spain
Argentina
France
Germany (FS:
DU)
USA

C
C

Large
Unknown

3 million
2.5 million

3.2 million
2.8 million

N
C
C
C
N
C

Other individual
Extra-large
Extra-large
Small
Other individual
Unknown

1.7 million
4.5 million
5.5 million
6 million
2.8 million
1.6 million

1.7 million
6.4 million
7.4 million
9 million
2.8 million
2.2 million

N

Super wealthy
individual
Large
Small
Other individual
Large
Other individual
Other individual

8.6 million

12 million

2 million
3.5 million
2.4 million
9 million
3 million
8.7 million

2.8 million
3.9 million
2.8 million
15 million
8 million
8.7 million

Eastern Sugar v Costa Rica

Occidental Petroleum v
Ecuador No 1
OKO Pankki Oyj v Estonia
Kardassapoulos v Georgia
Fuchs v Georgia
RDC v Guatemala

Desert Line Products v Yemen
Funnekotter v Zim
Continental Casualty v
Argentina
Saipem v Bangladesh
Goetz v Burundi No 1
Goetz v Burundi No 2
SD Myers v Canada
MTD Equity v Chile
American Manufacturing v
Congo
Reinhard Unglaube v Costa Rica
Duke Energy v Ecuador
Middle East Cement v Egypt
Wena Hotels v Egypt
White Industries v India
AIG Capital v Kazakhstan
Petrobart v Kyrgyzstan No 2
Sistem Muhendislik v
Kyrgyzstan
Nykomb v Latvia
Swembalt v Latvia
Feldman v Mexico
Gemplus v Mexico
Tecmed v Mexico
Talsud v Mexico
Arif v Moldova
Saar Papier v Poland
Awdi v Romania
Renta 4 v Russia
RosInvestCo v Russia
Sedelmayer v Russia
PSEG v Turkey
Alpha Projektholding v Ukraine
Lemire v Ukraine No 2

Spain
UK (FS: DU)
Germany
USA
Austria
USA

C
C
N
C
N
N
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Pope & Talbot v Canada
Mitchell v Congo
Swisslion v Macedonia
Bogdanov v Moldova No 1
Bogdanov v Moldova No 2
Tza Yap Shum v Peru
Maffezini v Spain
AAPL v Sri Lanka
Fedax v Venezuela

Nordzucker v Poland
Rompetrol v Romania
Al-Bahloul v Tajikistan
Biwater v Tanzania
Total: 86 cases

USA
USA
Switzerland (FS:
Serbia)
Russia
Russia

C
N
C

Medium
Other individual
Medium

460000
750000
440000

460000
1.1 million
490000

N
N

Other individual
Other individual

280000
160000

China
Argentina
UK (FS DU)
Netherlands (FS
DU)

N
N
C
C

Other individual
Other individual
Unknown
Unknown

790000
410000
460000
600000

280000
data unavailable
(DU)
1 million
490000
610000
760000

Germany
Netherlands
(FS: Romania)
Austria
UK

C
C

Large
Large

0
0

0
0

N
C

Other individual
Unknown

0
0

0
0

C: 61
N: 25

X-large: 26
Large: 14
Medium: 4
Small: 4
Unknown: 13
Super wealthy
individual: 5
Other
individual: 20

Total: 7191
million

Total: 9164
million

3. The Yukos cases
As noted in the appendix, three Yukos cases that led to a combined award of USD50
billion are reported separately from the above data due to the sheer size of the overall
order of compensation and to assist the reader in drawing his or her own conclusions.
For our part, we classified these cases – arising claims by the companies Yukos Universal
Limited (YUL), Hulley Enterprises Limited (Hulley), and Veteran Petroleum Trust – as
cases brought by a super wealthy individual, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, on the following
basis.4
In 1997, several Russian businessmen including Mr. Khodorkovsky registered an offshore company in Gibraltar called Flaymon Limited, which was soon after re-named
Group MENATEP Limited (MENATEP). When the relevant ISDS claims were filed, the
share capital of MENATEP was distributed among Khodorkovsky (9.5%), Leonid Nevzlin
(8%), Mikhail Brudno (7%), Platon Lebedev (7%), Vladimir Dubov (7%), Vasily
Shakhnovsky (7%), and others (4.5%). The remaining 50% was held by a trust fund called
4

The detailed research on these cases case was conducted by Malysheuski based on online sources:
http://www.pca-cpa.org/VET-_Interim_Award_-_30_Nov_200972dc.PDF?fil_id=2721;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bank_Menatep#Group_Menatep_Limited;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millhouse_Capital; https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Group_MENATEP;
http://khodorkovsky.ru/media/0001-293_%5Bt.175_l.d._1-293%5D.doc
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the Special Trust Arrangement, the sole beneficiary of which was Khodorkovsky. In
effect, Khodorkovsky directly and indirectly owned 59.5% of MENATEP. MENATEP
owned in turn 100% of the shares of YUL, another off-shore company registered in the
Isle of Man. YUL in turn owned 100% of the shares of Hulley, an off-shore company
registered in Cyprus that owned 57.47% of the shares of Joint Stock Company "NC"
Yukos (another 3.54% of this company was owned by YUL directly). YUL also had
another 100%-owned Cyprus-registered subsidiary, Veteran Petroleum Ltd (VPL). At the
time of the Yukos bankruptcy in 2005, MENATEP controlled 51% of Yukos shares
through YUL and Hulley and an additional 10% through Veteran Petroleum Trust (a trust
established by VPL under the laws of the state of Jersey).5 Effectively, a group of six
Russian oligarchs including Khodorkovsky controlled 62% of Yukos through the off-shore
vehicles YUL, Hulley, and VPL at the material times.6 By his ownership of the largest
stake, we considered Khodorkovsky, in objective terms, to be the directing or
influencing mind in the Yukos group of entities.
Incidentally, these cases appear to be examples of forum-shopping whereby individuals
were allowed to bring ISDS claims against their own state by using companies or other
entities abroad. Khodorkovsky, Lebedev, and Shakhnovsky are Russian citizens; Brudno,
Nevzlin, and Dubov acquired Israeli citizenship in addition to their Russian citizenship
after leaving Russia for Israel in 2003, after criminal proceedings were brought against
them in Russia.
In any event, due to their size, the three Yukos awards were distinct from the others in
the dataset and so have been reported separately. The exclusion of these cases reduced
vastly – from 89% to 12.6% (or from 86.3% to 11.7% including pre-award interest) – the
proportion of the total compensation that was ordered for super wealthy individuals.
Case

Hulley v Russia

Claimant
nationality (with
apparent forum
shopping (FS)
indicated)
Cyprus (FS: Russia)

Corporation
or natural
person

Claimant
size or
wealth

Amount awarded

Amount awarded +
pre-award interest

N

Super
wealthy
individual

39972 million

39972 million

5

In the case of VPL, a Swiss court found that Khodorkovsky, Lebedev, Golubovitch, Nevzlin, Doubov, Brudno and
Chakhnovski were the beneficial owners of the totality of Yukos shares allegedly owned or controlled by VPL;
Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 228 (Interim Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, 30 November 2009), para. 71 (E-43) and 420.
6
Another 8.8% of Yukos was controlled by Roman Abramovich, another Russian oligarch, through his United
Kingdom vehicle Millhouse Capital. The remaining approximately 39% of Yukos stock was held by various hedge
funds, American Depository Receipts (ADRs), and minor shareholders.
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Veteran Petroleum v
Russia
Yukos v Russia

Cyprus (FS: Russia)

N

Isle of Man (FS:
Russia)

N

Super
wealthy
individual
Super
wealthy
individual

8203 million

8203 million

1846 million

1846 million

4. Apparent forum-shopping
The investigation of ultimate ownership of ISDS claimants brought to light some cases of
apparent forum-shopping. The concept of forum-shopping here included situations
where the historical base or nationality of the ultimate owner in a claimant group
differed from that of the opposite state under the relevant treaty used for the ISDS
claim.
The primary finding was that this forum-shopping had a major effect for U.S.
beneficiaries; the ordered compensation increased by 70% after accounting for the
forum-shopping. It also had a major effect for Netherlands’ beneficiaries, leading to a
decrease of 98%. In turn, the ordered compensation for U.S. beneficiaries rose from a
minority (39%) to a majority (66%) of the overall total. Accounting for this forumshopping also modestly increased the ordered compensation for UK, German, or (in a
case with very little awarded) Serbian beneficiaries and modestly decreased it for
Turkish or, for the tiny award to a Serbian beneficiary, Swiss beneficiaries.
The following table indicates the ordered transfers by country, with and without
apparent forum-shopping. It also includes notes on our incidental findings on forumshopping including a note of those situations where there was apparent forum-shopping
but data was unavailable on ultimate ownership of the ISDS claim.
Country of
ISDS claim

USA

No. of cases

Netherlands

25.5
(one shared
with UK)
7

Germany

7

UK

6.5
(one shared
with USA)

No. of cases
accounting for
apparent
forumshopping
28.5

2
(includes one
FS: data
unavailable
(DU))
7.5
(includes one
FS: DU)
7.5 cases
(two FS cases
shared with

Amount
awarded

Amount
awarded
accounting for
apparent FS

Amount including
pre-award interest

2785 million

4701 million

3591 million

Amount including
pre-award
interest
accounting for
apparent FS
6113 million

1946 million

40 million

2551 million

54 million

346 million

363.5 million

407 million

424.5 million

251 million

331 million

314 million

414 million
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France

Germany and
Turkey)
(includes 2 FS:
DU)
5.5

Spain
Italy

5.5
(one shared
with Belgium)
4
3

625 million

NA

746 million

NA

4
3
(includes major
award where
claimant was
dual national,
not classified as
FS)
3
(includes one
FS: DU)
2.5

58 million
102 million

NA
NA

66 million
168 million

NA
NA

Sweden

3

122 million

NA

162 million

NA

Belgium

Argentina

2.5
(one shared
with France)
2

72 million

NA

108 million

NA

2

7 million

NA

10 million

NA

Austria

2

2

3 million

NA

8 million

NA

Greece

2

17 million

NA

49 million

NA

Switzerland

2

2
(includes one
FS: DU)
1

39 million

39 million

65 million

64 million

Turkey

2

134 million

71 million

175 million

92.5 million

Australia

1

4.1 million

NA

11 million

NA

Barbados

1

1.5
(one shared
with UK)
1
(includes 1 FS:
DU)
0

46 million

0

60 million

0

China

1

1

0.8 million

NA

1 million

NA

Cyprus

1

76 million

NA

76 million

NA

Finland

1

1
(includes 1 FS:
DU)
1

11 million

NA

14 million

NA

Gibraltar

1

1.1 million

NA

1.5 million

NA

Israel

1

1
(includes 1 FS:
DU)
1

15 million

NA

45 million

NA

Malaysia

1

1

6 million

NA

7 million

NA

Moldova

1

1

498 million

NA

498 million

NA

Oman

1

1

25 million

NA

35 million

NA

Russia

2

2

0.4 million

NA

0.4 million

NA

Romania
Serbia

0
0

1
1

NA
NA

0
0.4 million

NA
NA

0
0.5 million

B. Legal outcomes by size or wealth of ISDS beneficiary
8

We also compared legal outcomes in ISDS cases, at the jurisdictional, merits, and
combined stages of a case, to the size or wealth of claimants. The findings are outlined
below.
Keeping in mind that these are descriptive statistics, the only noteworthy findings
appears to be the higher success rate of extra-large companies: 70.8% combined over
48 cases with a confirmed adjudicative resolution at the jurisdictional and/ or the merits
stage. In contrast, the success rate of other claimants was 42.2% combined over 166
cases. However, the success rates of large (as opposed to extra-large) companies (44.7%
over 38 cases) and of super wealthy individuals (36.4% over 22 cases) was comparable
to those of other claimants not including large or extra-large companies or super
wealthy individuals (42.5% over 106 cases).
In particular, the success rate of extra-large companies at the merits stage (82.9% over
41 cases) was much higher than that of other claimants (57.9% over 121 cases).
Claimant
size or
wealth
Extralarge
company
Large
company
Medium
company
Small
company
Unknown
company
Super
wealthy
individual
Other
individual

Cases
coded for
size or
wealth
70

Cases with
confirmed
adjudicative
resolution
48

54

Outcome:
jurisdiction
not found

Outcome:
jurisdiction
found

Success
rate:
jurisdiction

Outcome:
violation
not found

Outcome:
violation
found

Success
rate:
merits

Overall
success
rate

7

54

88.5%

7

34

82.9%

70.8%

38

9

39

81.3%

12

17

58.6%

44.7%

18

9

1

16

94.1%

3

5

62.5%

55.6%

16

11

3

10

76.9%

3

5

62.5%

45.5%

48

41

11

31

73.8%

16

14

46.7%

34.1%

26

22

8

15

65.2%

6

8

57.1%

36.4%

57

45

13

37

74.0%

11

21

65.6%

46.7%

292

214

52

201

79.5%

58

104

64.2%

48.6%

C. Size or wealth of claimants and ordered financial transfers compared to ISDS
costs
We also compared the data on ordered compensation, classified by claimant size or
wealth, to approximate legal and arbitration costs in ISDS. The estimate of costs per
case was taken from an OECD survey that reported an average of USD8 million in ISDS
legal and arbitration costs per case for both sides, with some cases exceeding USD30
million in costs.7
7

D. Gaukrodger and K. Gordon, “Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy
Community”, OECD Working Paper on International Investment No. 2012/03 (OECD, 2012), 19. The OECD analysis
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These estimated costs are approximate because of a lack of detailed public information
on costs in ISDS awards. Also, the use of averages may skew the numbers in individual
cases if costs are higher in cases brought, for example, by larger or wealthier actors. As
discussed in the appendix to this paper, tracking of ISDS costs and ordered
compensation also does not cover all potential costs and benefits of ISDS.
The estimates do not account for cost shifting, which sometimes occurs in ISDS cases.
However, on this point, in 196 cases with the relevant data, cost shifting appeared on
average per case to have favoured respondent states for nearly all categories of
claimant size/ wealth. The clear exception was extra-large companies, which paid one
third of the costs on average per case where cost shifting occurred).8
Despite these limitations, the estimates are useful in evaluating tentatively whether the
financial position of small or medium companies or non-super wealthy individuals
appears to have been improved due to ISDS, not only compared to larger or wealthier
investors, but also in absolute terms. That is, the estimate of average ISDS costs – taken
here to be USD4 million per case for the claimant investor(s) – suggests that a large
majority of these smaller investors (82%) spent more on ISDS costs than they received in
ordered transfers.
The approximate data on aggregate ordered compensation, accounting for assumed
ISDS costs, is outlined below.
Claimant size
or wealth

Measure of
size or
wealth

Extra-large
company

>$10
billion in
annual
revenue
>$1 billion
and <$10
billion in
annual

Large
company

Cases with
confirmed
adjudicative
resolution

Cases where
received
damages

Total
awarded, raw
sum only

48

26

5282 million

Total
awarded,
raw sum
plus preaward
interest
6718 million

38

14

601 million

780 million

Total
estimated
ISDS legal
and
arbitration
costs
192 million

152 million

Net gain/
loss

+6526
million

+628
million

covered 143 available ISDS awards of which 28 provided information on arbitral fees and legal expenses, 81
provided some information on costs, and 62 provided no such information.
8
Of the 292 cases with information on claimant size, costs were found to have been shifted in 77 of 198 cases with
available data, of which 25 cases were brought by a small or medium company or a non-super wealthy individual
(with average cost shifting per case of 57.8% allocated to the claimant and 42.2% to the respondent) and 14 cases
by an unknown company (57.6% to the claimant). These portions of shifted cost borne by claimants were modestly
lower than in cases brought by large companies (67.8% to the claimant in 14 cases) and tycoons (62.5% to the
claimant in 10 cases) and substantially higher than in cases brought by extra-large companies (33.4% to the
claimant in 14 cases).
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Medium
company

Small
company

Unknown
company

Super wealthy
individual
Other
individual

revenue
>$100
million and
<$1 billion
in annual
revenue
<$100
million in
annual
revenue
data
unavailable
(DU) for
annual
revenue
>$100
million in
net wealth
<$100
million in
net wealth

9

4

13 million

17 million

36 million

-19 million

11

4

80 million

99 million

44 million

+55 million

41

13

132 million

154 million

164 million

-10 million

22

5

905 million

1072 million

88 million

+984
million

45

20

179 million

325 million

180 million

+145
million

Within this grouping of smaller enterprises, the tentative analysis suggested that a net
loss in ISDS cases for medium companies was outweighed by a net gain for small
companies and non-super wealthy individuals. For companies with unknown annual
revenues, it appeared that there was a net loss
The overall gain for smaller enterprises appeared to be concentrated in a fairly small
minority of beneficiaries. At the case level, a net gain was apparent in 12 (18.5%) of 65
cases with a confirmed adjudicative resolution and not involving an extra-large or large
company, an unknown company, or a super wealthy individual. If one included unknown
companies in the grouping, a net gain appeared in 18 (17%) of 106 cases. These were
the cases in which the smaller or unknown investor received an ordered transfer
exceeding the assumed average of USD4 million in ISDS legal and arbitration costs.
These 18 cases are listed below.
Case

Siag v Egypt
ADC v Hungary
Guaracachi v Bolivia
Pey Casado v Chile

Kardassapoulos v Georgia
Fuchs v Georgia
Metalclad v Mexico
Walter Bau v Thailand
Desert Line Products v
Yemen
Funnekotter v Zim

Claimant
nationality (with
apparent forum
shopping
indicated)
Italy (FS: dual
national of Egypt)
Cyprus (FS: data
unavailable (DU))
UK, USA
Spain

Claimant size or
wealth

Amount awarded

Amount plus preaward interest
where available

Other individual

75 million

129 million

Unknown

76 million

76 million

29 million
10 million

36 million
14 million

Greece
Israel
USA (FS: DU)
Germany
Oman

Small
Other individual
(and non-profit
org)
Other individual
Other individual
Unknown
Small
Other individual

15 million
15 million
17 million
41 million
25 million

45 million
45 million
17 million
50 million
30 million

Netherlands

Other individual

11 million

25 million

11

American Manufacturing
v Congo
Reinhard Unglaube v
Costa Rica
Wena Hotels v Egypt
White Industries v India
Sistem Muhendislik v
Kyrgyzstan
Talsud v Mexico
Alpha Projektholding v
Ukraine
Lemire v Ukraine No 2

USA (FS: DU)

Unknown

9 million

9 million

Germany

Other individual

3.1 million

4.1 million

UK (FS: DU)
Australia (FS: DU)
Turkey (FS: DU)

Unknown
Unknown
Unknown

8.8 million
4.1 million
8.5 million

19 million
11 million
10 million

Argentina
Austria

Small
Other individual

6 million
3 million

9 million
8 million

USA

Other individual

8.7 million

8.7 million

Therefore, from this tentative and limited perspective, ISDS appears to have created
among smaller and unknown investors a small number of lucky winners and a much
larger number of apparent losers.
The data on ISDS costs also highlights financial benefits of ISDS for ISDS lawyers,
arbitrators, experts, and other actors who earn income from ISDS fees. In 214 ISDS cases
with a confirmed adjudicative resolution, based on the OECD estimate of ISDS costs the
total payments of fees from disputing parties to the ISDS industry would have been
about USD1.7 billion.
III.

Conclusion

The purpose of this article was to assess claims about ISDS linked to the size and wealth
of foreign investors who bring claims and obtain orders of compensation in their favour.
Broadly, ISDS was approached as a system that generates financial transfers, with a
focused on ordered compensation by first-instance tribunals. The findings on the
apparent transfers can be summarized as follows (all figures in USD):
From states to extra-large9 companies:
From states to super wealthy individuals10:
From states to large11 companies:
From states to other individuals12:
From states to other13 companies:
Total from states to foreign investors:

6718 million in 48 cases
1072 million in 22 cases
780 million in 38 cases
325 million in 45 cases
270 million in 61 cases
9164 million in 214 cases

From states to ISDS industry:14
From other companies to ISDS industry:

856 million
244 million

9

Over USD10 billion in annual revenue.
Over USD100 million in net wealth.
11
Over USD1 billion in annual revenue, less than USD10 billion.
12
Under USD100 million in net wealth. Includes both confirmed and apparent non-super wealthy individuals.
13
Over USD100 million in annual revenue, less than USD1 billion. Includes companies for which annual revenues
were unknown.
14
Primarily lawyers and arbitrators but also including paid experts and arbitral institutions.
10

12

From extra-large companies to ISDS industry: 192 million
From other individuals to ISDS industry:
180 million
From large companies to ISDS industry:
152 million
From super wealthy individuals to ISDS industry:88 million
Total from disputing parties to ISDS industry: 1700 million in 214 cases

From the same perspective, net winners and losers in the aggregate emerged as follows:
Big winners
Extra-large companies:
ISDS industry:
Super wealthy individuals:
Large companies:

6526 million (136 million per adjudicated case)
1712 million (8 million)
984 million (45 million)
628 million (17 million)

Modest winners
Other individuals:
Small and medium companies:

145 million (3 million)
36 million (2 million)

Modest losers
Companies with unknown annual revenue:

-10 million (-0.2 million)

Big losers
Respondent states:

-10020 million (-47 million)

These data are not based on elaborate statistical analysis; they support descriptive
findings about what has happened in ISDS but should not be taken as predictions of
future outcomes. The findings may reflect coincidences and be subject to a risk of error
that precludes predictive claims. The main contribution of our study is to show how ISDS
has unfolded from the point of view of financial transfers based on a comprehensive
review of known ISDS cases. The findings are perhaps most useful where they reveal
wide variations in the experiences of different actors and where they cast doubt on
claims about ISDS that are not based on comparable evidence.
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Appendix: Limitations, dataset, and methodology
Our research and analysis focused on aggregate ordered compensation by first-instance
tribunals. We did not attempt to track actual records of payment of awards or account
for changes in ordered compensation due to set aside or annulment decisions. Also,
there are other ways to measure claimant success in ISDS. We have moved beyond an
approach based on win-loss outcomes in ISDS litigation to a somewhat more complex
measure based on aggregate ordered compensation. More ambitiously, one could
assess claimant success in terms of less overt and non-financial costs and benefits, such
as the utility of ISDS as a tool to influence regulatory-decision-making. Other forms of
assessment would be more comprehensive but also less measurable numerically and
more amenable, we suspect, to qualitative than quantitative tools. For these and other
reasons discussed in the introduction to this paper and below, our research and analysis
generates only an approximate and descriptive picture of aspects of ISDS as a system
that leads to financial transfers.
The underlying dataset for this paper included all known and publicly-available ISDS
cases that led to a decision on jurisdiction, at least, as of spring of 2015. The most
relevant fields in the dataset for this paper were: claimant nationality, date and
outcome of award on jurisdiction, date and outcome of award on merits, amount
awarded (converted to USD as of the date of the award), and damages awarded with
and without pre-award interest (calculated, where applicable, using the interest rate
and date range stipulated by the tribunal). Awards were not adjusted for time value of
money because our aim was to provide simple and descriptive findings supported by
public data where none presently exists on the issue.
The underlying dataset was compiled by five law school students, most recently Ryan De
Vries, working as research assistants over a period of seven years. Each assistant, after
initial training, collected information on ISDS cases from publicly-available awards and
other decisions up to the relevant time cut-off. The main source of awards and other
decisions was italaw.com supplemented by official websites of the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the Permanent Court of Arbitration
(PCA), the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), and the federal governments of
Canada, Mexico, and the United States. An award or decision had to be available on
italaw.com and allow for verification as a treaty-based case, or the case had to be
identified as treaty-based on one of the official websites just listed, in order for the case
to be included in the analysis. Coding results were screened by the author (i.e.
approximately half of the coding decisions were checked for errors) and past coding was
checked and sometimes re-coded by another research assistant. For the data used in
the present article, relevant coding rarely involved significant discretionary choices by
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the coder; rather, it focused on descriptive information on ISDS cases that tended to be
clear in the award or other decision. Considering the extent of information collected and
the absence of a comprehensive double or triple coding process, there is a risk of
occasional error in data entry.
In a significant minority of cases in the dataset, roughly 15%, one or more of the
relevant awards or decisions were not public. Also, there are an unknown number of
cases that can be assumed to be completely confidential. For the dataset overall, there
is a reasonable prospect that this confidentiality may impact the findings, especially for
fields connected to arbitration forums and where one forum is more open than another.
For the present analysis, in one exceptional case (Suez & Interaguas v Argentina) public
information was available up to, but not for, a known award on damages. For this case
only, a non-official source (Investment Arbitration Reporter) was relied on to code the
amount awarded to the claimant.
Within this ISDS case dataset, all confirmed treaty-based cases were then classified for
size or wealth of the claimant up to the spring of 2014 (specifically, up to posting on
italaw.com as of 18 April 2014). Co-author Pavel Malysheuski – a corporate/ commercial
and securities lawyer with knowledge of ISDS – determined reasonable measures of the
size and wealth of claimants and coded the cases for size and wealth of the claimant.
Companies were classified based on their annual revenue as small (under USD100
million in annual revenue), medium (over USD100 million, under USD1 billion) large
(over USD1 billion), or extra-large (over USD10 billion). For individuals, those with an
apparent net wealth of more than USD100 million were classified as super wealthy;
those whose net wealth was not found to exceed this threshold as other individuals.15
Annual revenue and net wealth was examined at the time of the relevant award or
decision in the ISDS case.16
This approach to classification over-stated the role of small and medium enterprises and
non-super wealthy individuals in ISDS. The categories used to identify small and medium
– with annual revenues under USD100 million and USD1 billion respectively – were
much more inclusive than what other measures would consider a small or medium
enterprise.17 Likewise, some may consider individuals who have a net wealth below
15

A more sophisticated analysis would treat annual revenue and net wealth as continuous variables; the
classifications used here were simpler to code – especially in the case of net wealth – and thought sufficient to give
an overall picture of past financial transfers.
16
There were a few complicating cases, such as PacRim v El Salvador where ownership of the claim shifted from a
small to a medium company in the course of the dispute (albeit without affecting the findings on ordered
compensation because the case is ongoing) but for the most part the issue did not raise coding challenges.
17
e.g. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD SME and Entrepreneurship Outlook: 2005
(Paris: OECD), 17, citing EU definitions based on annual turnover of EUR10 million for small enterprises and EUR50
million for medium enterprises.
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USD100 million as still rich compared to owners of small and medium enterprises and
other individuals. For the reasons, the findings may over-state the number of ISDS cases
and financial transfers for small or medium-sized enterprises.
Where information was unavailable on a company’s annual revenue, the company was
classified as unknown. This separate category was used – instead of assuming, for
example, that all such companies were small or medium – because, although some such
companies appeared likely to be small or medium, others appeared to be potential
holding companies where ultimate ownership could not be tracked. In contrast, where
data was unavailable on an individual’s net wealth, it was assumed that the individual
was not super wealthy on the assumption that an individual worth USD100 million or
more would be identifiable as such using standard online sources. In any event, as will
be seen below, these classification issues appeared not to impact significantly the main
findings of the paper.
Where there were multiple claimant nationalities (e.g. a claim both by a foreign
company and by a subsidiary in the host state), the opposite nationality under the treaty
or treaties under which the ISDS claim was brought was classified as the primary
nationality. In a few cases, primary nationality was shared because the claim was
brought under multiple treaties. The results of this coding allowed for incidental and
approximate findings on apparent forum-shopping. That is, cases were noted as
apparent forum-shopping cases where the largest or wealthiest owner of a claimant was
based in, or (for individuals) had the nationality of, a country other than the primary
nationality in the ISDS case. This was a loose approach to dealing with potential forumshopping in that it did not ask whether the company in the opposite state under the
treaty had a substantial connection to that state or whether the ultimate owner’s
incorporation decision in the opposite state was made with express intent to facilitate
an ISDS claim. Instead, forum-shopping as analyzed here captured (a) situations in which
multinationals brought an ISDS claim from a jurisdiction within their network of
corporate nationalities that was not their historical base of operations and (b) situations
in which a super wealthy individual acquired the nationality of the opposite state by
incorporating in that state. As will be seen, the clearest finding on forum-shopping that
is directly relevant to financial transfers involves U.S. large or extra-large parent
companies or U.S. super wealthy individuals that benefited from ISDS claims made by
corporate claimants in the Netherlands.
Also for cases involving multiple claimants, each case was classified as having a single
claimant size or wealth based on precedence for the largest or wealthiest ultimate
owner of a claimant in the case. To illustrate, a claim both by a domestic company of the
host state and by the foreign corporate owner of that company under the treaty, where
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the latter was ultimately owned by an extra-large parent company in a third state, was
classified as a claim by the extra-large parent company. Alternatively, a claim by a
medium company owned by a super wealthy individual was classified as a claim by that
individual. In short, cases were coded based on the largest or wealthiest actor in the
group of both claimants and ultimate owners of claimants. Although it did not arise in
any of the cases coded here, precedence would have been given to classification as an
extra-large or large company rather than as a super wealthy individual.
In light of these assumptions for cases involving multiple claimants, the data was
reviewed to identify possible misrepresentations arising from situations in which
multiple claimants of different sizes or wealth brought a claim and the case was
classified as having been brought by the largest or wealthiest claimant in the group. In
the great majority of such cases, the claimant group consisted of multiple companies in
the same corporate group; multiple companies of the same size; multiple companies
with one or more unknown companies alongside an large or extra-large company and
apparently falling within the larger corporate group; multiple claimants with one or
more unknown companies alongside an individual; multiple individuals including a super
wealthy individual and one or more other individuals who were family members of or
otherwise apparently related to the super wealthy individual; or multiple individuals
none of whom appeared super wealthy. For all of these situations, in our view the
coding assumptions for cases involving multiple claimants were appropriate.
However, there was one case – Abengoa v Mexico – where compensation was ordered
and the coding assumptions appeared to risk misrepresenting the results. The claim was
brought by an extra-large and an apparently unrelated large company but was coded as
a claim by the extra-large company. The ordered compensation in the case was USD40
million (USD42 million including pre-award interest). We opted not to use an alternative
coding approach – such as a 50-50 attribution of the claim between the two companies
or attribution based on their relative size or ownership stake in the disputed assets –
because the case had little effect on the overall findings, the alternative coding
approaches also had an arbitrary quality, the coding assumptions did not otherwise
appear to raise concerns about misrepresentation, and, with the present disclosure,
readers are able to evaluate and adjust the findings as they see fit.
Overall, the dataset had 292 cases coded for claimant size or wealth as of the spring of
2014 with data on outcomes, including amounts awarded, up to the spring of 2015.18 Of
18

Three cases were coded as NA (not applicable) for claimant size or wealth because it was difficult to identify a
corporate or individual claimant based on the coding assumptions. They included cases brought by a state entity
(Kaliningrad v Lithuania), a series of irrigation districts and individuals (Bayview Irrigation v Mexico), and a series of
natural and juridical persons (CCFT v USA). None of these cases led to a damages award; the first lacked public
information and the other two were dismissed at the jurisdictional stage.
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these 292 cases, 253 were coded as having a jurisdictional outcome, i.e. a verifiable
decision of the tribunal finding or not finding jurisdiction (other cases typically were
ongoing or resolved before a jurisdictional outcome). Of these 253 cases, the tribunal
declined jurisdiction in 52 cases and accepted jurisdiction in 201. Of these 201 cases, the
tribunal did not find a violation of the treaty in 58 cases and found a violation in 162
(again, other cases typically were ongoing or had settled before a merits decision). Of
these 162 cases, there were 89 in which an amount was confirmed to have been
awarded (in four of these cases the amount was zero). Three of these 89 cases – the
Yukos cases totalling USD50 billion in ordered compensation – swamped the other
results and were relatively challenging to code for size or wealth of the claimant. For
these reasons, these cases were presented separately in the paper. The remaining 86
cases constitute the dataset analyzed for ordered compensation due to ISDS.
Notably, two cases that led to awards were excluded from the 86 cases. CSOB v Slovakia
was excluded because it was classified as a contract-based case although it fell close to
the line and is arguably a contract-treaty hybrid. ATA v Jordan was also excluded
because it led to the remedy of an order that another arbitration could go ahead and so
was difficult to quantify in terms of monetary value. Both cases involved claims by a
large or extra-large company. For the record, I have provided the relevant data on the
two excluded cases below. The main impact of the exclusion of these cases was to
reduce the share of aggregate ordered compensation for extra-large companies from
76.8% (76.1% including pre-award interest) to 73.5% (73.3%).
Case

CSOB v Slovakia
ATA v Jordan

Claimant nationality
(with apparent
forum shopping (FS)
indicated)
Czech Republic (FS:
Belgium)
Turkey

Corporation
or natural
person

Claimant size
or wealth

Amount awarded

Amount awarded +
pre-award interest
where available

C

Extra-large

1050 million

1050 million

C

Large

NA – non monetary
order that other
arbitration can
proceed

NA – non monetary
order that other
arbitration can
proceed

For the main analysis for this paper, ordered compensation at first-instance (i.e. not
including set aside or annulment decisions) was compared to claimant size and wealth in
all cases to the spring of 2014. Legal outcomes at the jurisdictional, merits, and
combined stages of ISDS cases were also compared to claimant size and wealth. Finally,
ordered compensation was compared to average ISDS costs for the disputing parties as
estimated by other researchers.19 Findings on apparent forum-shopping were recorded
incidentally, as discussed above.

19

Gaukrodger and Gordon, above n 7.
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